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Firms play a key role in generating labor market inequality (Abowd et al., 1999, Card et al.).
However, while an emerging body of evidence has documented that frms’ wage policies represent
an important determinant of earnings disparities, less is known about how other typical features of
frm policies, such as their promotion practices, afect worker outcomes and the allocation of talent
in the labor market. In my dissertation, I collect a unique dataset from the personnel records of a
large multinational frm in order to examine how frms’ organizational design contributes to gender
disparities in labor market outcomes. As a manufacturer, the frm I study employs over 200,000
workers in more than 200 occupations, allowing me to analyze how men and women difer in their
career progression across a broad range of diferent work environments. For my main analysis, I
focus on the frm’s biggest internal labor market, which includes the over 30,000 white-collar and
management employees who are based in Germany.
All three single-authored chapters of this dissertation draw on the new dataset I assemble, which
combines twenty years of detailed personnel records and payroll data with managers’ private and
public evaluations of worker talent, as recorded in the frm’s talent management system. I link
these records to the universe of application and hiring decisions at the frm from 2015 to 2019,
allowing me to separate workers’ labor supply decisions (i.e. applications for internal job switches)
from the frm’s labor demand decisions (i.e. hiring decisions). The application data also contain
information on each of the over 16,000 job vacancies at the frm from 2015 to 2019, including the
original job posting as well as information on the over 300,000 internal and external applicants who
apply to these vacancies. To provide new insights on the impediments women perceive with respect
to their career progression, I augment the administrative data by conducting two large-scale surveys
to which all employees in my sample were invited to and which both received a 50% response rate.
Chapter 1 of my dissertation documents the important role that managers play for workers’
career progression by providing the frst empirical evidence on the scope and negative consequences
of talent hoarding in organizations. I show that because women react more to managerial talent
hoarding then men, talent hoarding deters high-quality women from applying for promotions which
they would have likely landed and in which they would have performed well in. My fndings document that talent hoarding not only leads to misallocation of talent in the frm, but also exacerbates
gender inequality in representation and pay, highlighting the important role that frms’ organizational design plays for gender disparities in the labor market. The results in this chapter suggest
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that policies that increase application rates while deterring managers from retaliating against workers, for instance by insuring full confdentiality for applicants, represent efective tools to improve
the representation of women in higher-level positions.
Understanding the key root causes of female underrepresentation is critical for identifying efective policy remedies. Chapter 2 therefore investigates when gender diferences in representation frst
occur in employees’ careers. In the past, attention has been mostly devoted to the fact that women
are less likely to hold top leadership positions than men, likely because of data limitations. This
chapter introduces a new hierarchy measure that allows me to assess female representation along
the leadership hierarchy. I fnd that a key bottleneck for women’s career progression arises early on,
at the transition to the frst leadership level, and that this bottleneck is driven by gender diferences
in promotions, not by diferential entry to or exit from the frm. In stark contrast to the common
notion of a glass ceiling at higher-level leadership positions, there appear to be no large bottlenecks
at higher levels. To that end, the results in this chapter indicate that policies that target women in
lower-level positions may be particularly efective to combat the gender gap.
Chapter 3 builds on the fndings from Chapter 2 and investigates what may be driving the
gender gap at the frst leadership level. I fnd that women are not less likely to learn about job
openings at the frm and do not experience lower hiring likelihoods than male applicants. Instead,
gender diferences in preferences for leading a team account for women’s lower propensities to apply
for and ultimately attain frst-level leadership positions. Two large-scale surveys of employees at
the frm corroborate these fndings and point to diferences in perceptions of and preferences over
job characteristics associated with leadership positions as key underlying mechanisms. My results
further suggest that policies that alter the design of leadership positions, for instance by reducing
the number of direct reports, and policies that provide better information about team leadership,
for instance through job shadowing, represent efective tools to increase female representation in
leadership positions.

Chapter 1. Talent Hoarding in Organizations
Firms must continually decide how to allocate workers to jobs, a process which has critical implications for productivity (Rosen, 1982, Holmstrom and Tirole, 1989). Because it is difcult to
perfectly observe worker ability, most frms rely on managers to identify talented workers who can
be promoted to higher-level positions. However, when a talented worker leaves their team for a promotion, team performance sufers. Since managers are rewarded based on team performance and
frms cannot perfectly monitor manager actions, the conficting interests of manager and frm create
the potential for moral hazard (Holmstrom, 1979). A growing body of evidence documents that
workers in high-level positions have large impacts on frm performance (Bloom and Van Reenen,
2007, Lazear et al., 2015), implying that managers may create signifcant efciency costs if they
hoard talented workers rather than promote them. In addition, if female workers place more value
on managers’ approval when making application decisions, talent hoarding may have a dispropor-
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tionate impact along gender lines and perpetuate existing gender inequality in the labor market.1
Ample anecdotal and survey evidence points to widespread talent hoarding in organizations.
In a global survey, half of organizations report that managers hoard talent by discouraging worker
mobility (i4cp, 2016). A US-based survey fnds that workers in one-third of frms feel the need to
keep internal applications secret from their managers out of fear of retaliation (KornFerry, 2015). In
Germany, 83% of the top publicly listed companies cite managerial talent hoarding as a key friction
in their organization (hkp, 2021). Despite the apparent prevalence of talent hoarding and its likely
detrimental consequences, very little empirical evidence on talent hoarding exists in economics.
Studying talent hoarding empirically is challenging. Managers often hoard talent through hidden
actions that are difcult to observe, even in rich datasets. Furthermore, identifying the causal
impacts of talent hoarding requires plausibly exogenous variation in hoarding.
This chapter provides the frst empirical evidence on talent hoarding and its negative impacts on
the efcient allocation of talent in organizations. I test for talent hoarding by drawing on several key
advantages of the new dataset I assembled. First, by combining personnel records with the universe
of application and hiring decisions at the frm, I am able to assess the extent to which talent hoarding
deters applications that would have been successful. Second, two novel measures of worker visibility
constructed from the frm’s internal HR databases allow me to infer managers’ propensities to
hoard talent by measuring the extent to which they systematically suppress the visibility of workers
on their team. Without such data, directly measuring talent hoarding is empirically challenging,
because by defnition hoarding involves hidden actions. Third, I use a granular measure of internal
job hierarchy to test whether talent hoarding causes misallocation of talent by evaluating whether
high-quality workers are deterred from moving to higher-level positions in which they would have
been more productive.
To empirically test for talent hoarding, I develop a new identifcation strategy that leverages
quasi-random variation in worker exposure to talent hoarding. When managers learn that they will
move to a new position on a diferent team, they no longer have an incentive to hoard workers on
their current team. Thus, manager rotations create a temporary window of time for workers in
which they will not be subject to talent hoarding. Empirically, rotation efects are large, efectively
doubling worker applications in the same quarter. I demonstrate that these efects can be interpreted as refecting the causal efect of a manager leaving her team. A placebo test shows that
manager applications for job rotations only increase worker applications if managers are successful
and actually leave the team.
This increase in applications is consistent with a series of predictions on talent hoarding that
follow from my conceptual framework. I frst show that rotations have larger efects on workers
who were previously subject to greater levels of talent hoarding, as captured by three dimensions
of heterogeneity: worker quality, the costliness of worker departure, and managers’ propensities
to hoard talent. I then leverage the rich job application data and show that manager rotations
1

Gender diferences in preferences and behavioral attributes (Bertrand, 2011) motivate that men and women might
react diferently to talent hoarding.
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disproportionally increase applications that under talent hoarding carry a greater risk of retaliation,
either because managers are likely to fnd out about the application or because applications are
unlikely to be successful. Moreover, I document that manager rotations only afect internal job
transitions within the frm that are subject to talent hoarding, but not external job transitions out
of the frm, which managers are not able to infuence.
A potential threat to the interpretation of the impacts of manager rotations as representing
the impacts of talent hoarding is that manager rotations may afect worker applications through
additional channels. For instance, workers may refrain from applying for a new position because of
loyalty towards their manager or because manager-worker-specifc match efects make their current
position particularly appealing. In addition, worker applications may result from team-level shocks
that are correlated with manager rotations, such as unpleasant working conditions, bad news about
the future outlook of the team, or the completion of a major milestone. In a series of tests, I fnd
that these channels alone are not able to account for the observed rotation efects, suggesting that
talent hoarding does play a role in deterring worker applications.
My fndings indicate that talent hoarding causes misallocation of talent by reducing the quality
and performance of promoted workers. To analyze misallocation, I focus on major promotions, such
as transitions from individual contributors to team leader positions, that refect meaningful changes
in job responsibility. Manager rotations increase worker applications for major promotions by 123%,
indicating that talent hoarding deters a large group of workers from applying for promotions. To
quantify how successful deterred applications would have been, I instrument for workers’ applications
with manager rotations. Marginal applicants, who would not have applied in absence of a manager
rotation, are similarly likely as average applicants to land a promotion and are likely to subsequently
outperform their teams in higher-level positions. A complier analysis fnds that marginal applicants
are positively selected in terms of their educational qualifcations and past performance. These
fndings suggest that in addition to reducing the number and the quality of applicants for higherlevel positions, talent hoarding lowers team performance at these levels.
I fnd that talent hoarding has disparate impacts by gender. Talent hoarding deters a larger
share of female applicants from applying for major promotions compared to men. Female marginal
applicants are twice as likely to land a major promotion than males, implying that talent hoarding
is more consequential for women’s career progression. Conditional on landing a promotion, women
are almost three times as likely as their male counterparts to perform well in their new positions,
suggesting that the frm may be failing to realize potential productivity gains by not enabling
talented women to progress to higher-level positions. Female marginal applicants are much more
qualifed than males in terms of their educational qualifcations and past performance, indicating
that talent hoarding afects women at a higher part of the quality distribution compared to men.
Talent hoarding exacerbates gender inequality in representation and pay. When comparing
potential outcomes for marginal applicants, I fnd that increasing applications through manager
rotations is much more benefcial for women than for men, reducing the gender representation gap
by 91% and the gender pay gap by 77% within one year. The disparate impacts of talent hoarding
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by gender are not driven by diferential treatment by managers. Rather, a survey of the frm’s
employees suggests that male and female workers react diferently to talent hoarding. In line with
the literature on gender diferences in preferences (Bertrand, 2011), the survey fnds that women in
the frm place more value on preserving a good relationship with their manager and rely more on
managers’ career guidance when making application decisions.
Because talent hoarding arises due to misaligned incentives, a natural solution would be to more
closely align the incentives of managers with those of the frm. Surveys of German frms suggest
that accomplishing this realignment through fnancial incentives is infeasible (hkp, 2021). However,
policies that increase application rates — such as implementing regular application schedules and
having other organizational agents, such as the HR department, directly invite workers to apply for
positions — could reduce the scope for managers to engage in talent hoarding. The employee survey
I conduct shows that for such policies to be efective, the frm must be able to deter managers from
retaliating against workers, for instance by assuring full confdentiality for applicants. While the
costs of these policies are likely to be non-negligible, their potential benefts are substantial given
the potential gains for frms. In addition to talent misallocation, the employee survey suggests that
talent hoarding has additional efciency costs through other channels, such as underinvestment in
human capital. In addition, workers who report being subject to talent hoarding are 30% more likely
to report having searched for external jobs, indicating that talent hoarding may create unwanted
turnover of high-quality workers the frm would like to retain.

Chapter 2. The Broken Rung: Gender and the Leadership Gap
Much attention has been devoted to the fact that women are less likely to hold top leadership
positions than men. While 47% of S&P 500 workers are female, women only make up 6% of CEOs
(Catalyst, 2021). Accordingly, most attempts to increase female leadership have focused on the very
top of the job ladder, as exemplifed by the increasing number of countries that have established
female quotas for corporate boards. However, recent work indicates that increased representation
in top positions does not necessarily trickle down to lower rungs of the job ladder (Bertrand et al.,
2018, Maida and Weber, 2020), bringing into question whether addressing representation in top
positions is sufcient to increase gender equality throughout the leadership hierarchy.
Despite the frst-order importance of identifying the key impediments for women’s underrepresentation in leadership positions, remarkably little empirical evidence exists on when gender gaps
in career progression frst emerge in the leadership hierarchy. Answering this question requires the
ability to distinguish between diferent levels of leadership. However, most datasets only contain
coarse measures of job hierarchy.
The difculty of measuring complex job hierarchies has represented a key impediment for previous research, leading researchers to focus on relatively narrow settings to study gender diferences
in career progression, such as supermarket workers (Ransom and Oaxaca, 2005), lawyers (Azmat
and Ferrer, 2017), central bankers (Hospido et al., 2019), and academics (Bosquet et al., 2019).
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Focusing on a narrow setting has the advantage of circumventing the need to defne a consistent job
hierarchy measure that tracks leadership levels across many diferent occupations and functional
areas, but precludes a broader analysis of job mobility.2 In my data, 15% of promotions occur
across functional areas (e.g. HR to IT), and multiple career paths exist within each functional area
(e.g. recruiters vs. talent management specialists in HR), indicating that a broader analysis of job
mobility is necessary to fully capture employees’ career progression.
The frst contribution of this chapter is the construction of a new and granular measure of job
hierarchy that can be used to compare leadership levels along the job ladder and across diferent
career paths. To construct this hierarchy ranking, I leverage detailed personnel records to combine
three key dimensions of leadership responsibility that directly capture employees’ authority and
autonomy over decision-making and which are also comparable across occupations: the cumulative
number of direct reports, the reporting distance to the CEO, and the extent of managerial autonomy. My hierarchy ranking is the frst principal component of these three dimensions, providing
a consistent ordering of all positions at the frm. The resulting hierarchy ranking ofers the key
advantages of being granular, independent of pay, and comparable across diferent career paths.
Another advantage is that the three inputs represent common elements of frms’ internal personal
records and are available in many frms. In addition, a large-scale survey of the employees in my
sample corroborates that the three inputs I use represent salient features of leadership positions.
The rich dataset I collected allows me to conduct several tests to validate the hierarchy ranking.
I fnd that the hierarchy ranking is strongly correlated with earnings, but that it is much more
efective at discerning between hierarchy levels at the bottom of the hierarchy relative to pay,
highlighting that pay-based measures are not well-suited to studying diferences at lower-levels of
the hierarchy. I also show that hierarchy levels difer substantially in terms of characteristics not
used to construct the hierarchy ranking, such as bonus payments or employees’ work experience and
educational qualifcations. A transition matrix of employees’ internal transitions documents that
increases in hierarchy levels represent typical steps in the job ladder.
The continuous hierarchy ranking allows me to identify points along the leadership hierarchy
that represent bottlenecks for female representation, providing new evidence that points towards a
broken rung rather than a glass ceiling as key impediment for women’s career progression. Female
shares drop substantially around the transition to frst-level leadership positions, from 22% to 12%.
In stark contrast to the common notion of a glass ceiling at higher-level leadership positions, there
appear to be no large bottlenecks at higher levels. Female representation falls only modestly after
the transition to frst-level leadership positions, from 12% to 7% at the highest levels. Another
advantage of my setting is that I am able to assess gender diferences exists across a broad range
2

In the literature on internal labor markets, a common approach is to infer the job hierarchy from fows between
position titles when focusing on small labor markets with few diferent occupations (Baker et al., 1994, Huitfeldt
et al., 2021). Given the complex structure of the internal labor market at the large manufacturer I study, such
approaches may not be well suited to studying larger labor markets. In addition, 26% of employees in my sample
share a position title with either their supervisor or their supervisor’s supervisor. Assigning them the same measure
of job hierarchy would underestimate diferences in leadership responsibility and likely leads to biased estimates of
the gender leadership gap.
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of work environments. I fnd that frst-level leadership positions represent the key bottleneck for
female representation both in male-dominated areas (e.g. engineering, IT) and in female-dominated
areas (e.g. HR, marketing), suggesting that the gender composition of the work environment alone
cannot account for my fndings.
To identify the drivers of the bottleneck at frst-level leadership positions, I assess gender differences in internal promotions, entry to and exit from the frm. Women at lower-levels of the
hierarchy are 68% less likely to move to frst-level leadership positions. This promotion gap persists
across diferent employee groups and cannot be fully explained by diferences in hours worked, family
demands, or educational qualifcations. Relative to men, women who transition to frst-level leadership positions are highly positively selected in terms of their educational qualifcations and past
performance at the frm, suggesting that men and women sort diferently into higher-level positions,
with a large share of qualifed women remaining at lower levels compared to men. Employees who
make it to frst-level leadership positions, however, do not exhibit gender diferences in subsequent
promotions.
Given that frm tenures tend to be long, these fndings underscore the key role that the gender
promotion gap plays for overall gender inequality in the labor market.3 In contrast to internal promotions, however, diferential entry to and exit from the frm do not play critical roles in explaining
female underrepresentation at higher levels. Even though women are more likely than men to enter
the frm at higher hierarchy levels, the vast majority of positions at the frm are flled by internal
candidates, highlighting the importance of internal promotions. In addition, women are less likely
than observationally similar men to exit the frm.
While previous research has almost exclusively focused on the possibility that a glass ceiling
at higher levels is a key determinant of gender diferences (Blau and Kahn, 2017), my fndings
echo a growing narrative among practitioners that a broken rung at the beginning of the career
ladder represents a major impediment for women’s career progression (McKinsey and LeanIn.Org,
2021). This fnding highlights the importance of focusing on gender diferences that arise early on
in the leadership pipeline. Policies that provide early exposure to leadership and encourage women
to try out frst-level leadership, such as job rotations or mentoring programs, could be efective
tools to bridge the leadership gap. Responses to the large-scale employee survey document that
among women at lower-level positions, access to mentorship is a common request in order to collect
information about what leadership positions entail.

Chapter 3. Gender, Leadership, and Diferences in Job Applications
Why are women less likely to advance to frst-level leadership positions? A growing body of evidence
has documented large gender diferences in preferences and attitudes (Bertrand, 2011), hypothesizing
that labor supply is a key channel through which female underrepresentation manifests. However,
direct evidence from real-world decisions in the workplace is scarce. In addition, inferring the drivers
3
In my sample, the average male (female) employee has worked at the frm for 13.6 (12.2) years. In the United
States, more than a third of mid-career workers have worked at their frm for at least 10 years (BLS 2020).
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of female underrepresentation from equilibrium outcomes is difcult, because diferences can arise
due to both labor supply and labor demand factors. Moreover, taking on frst leadership positions
typically comes with several changes in job characteristics and work environments, making it difcult
to pin down what exactly it is that makes leadership positions less appealing to women.
When studying gender diferences in preferences for such job characteristics, previous research
has mostly focused on characteristics that are easily measurable, such as pay or working hours (Mas
and Pallais, 2017, Wiswall and Zafar, 2018). Responsibility over a team, which is a very common
feature of frst-level leadership positions, however, has been understudied, likely because of a lack of
available data. If women have lower preferences for or more negative perceptions of team leadership,
signifcant efciency costs could arise if talented women remain at lower-levels instead of getting
promoted (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, Lazear et al., 2015).
This chapter provides the frst empirical evidence that large gender diferences in preferences
for team leadership exist and that these diferences translate into large application diferences for
promotions and subsequently female underrepresentation in leadership positions. To analyze employees’ labor supply decisions separately from the frm’s labor demand decisions, I take advantage
of the fact that the frm I study, as many other large frms, requires employees to actively apply in
order to make internal job transitions. I collect the universe of application and hiring decisions from
2015 to 2019, capturing each of the over 16,000 job openings at the frm, as well as each vacancy’s
original job posting and information about the over 300,000 internal and external applicants.
I fnd that women at lower-level positions are substantially less likely to apply for promotions
to frst leadership levels, even when accounting for employee demographics, detailed position characteristics, and performance. In contrast to applications for promotions, women are not less likely
to apply for lateral transitions than men, even if these require switching divisions, functional areas,
or locations. This pattern suggests that women in lower-level positions are not generally averse to
applying for positions that cause a substantial change in their work environment. In addition, I fnd
no evidence that women are less likely than men to get hired for internal job openings, conditional
on applying, echoing a recent focus in economics on supply-side factors as determinants of gender
gaps (Bertrand, 2018).
Responses to a large-scale survey of the frm’s employees suggest that responsibility for a team is
a particularly salient dimension of leadership that is less appealing to women in lower-level positions.
When asked where employees would like to see themselves with respect to their career progression,
women at low levels are 33% less likely to report preferences for leading a team. This gender
gap exists across key employee groups, such as employees working full-time or employees without
children, and is not explained by other factors, such as risk preferences, willingness to compete, or
confdence. Diferences in preferences for team leadership translate into diferences in applications.
Employees who state preferences for leading a team are twice as likely to have applied for a team
leadership position in the past 12 months. In contrast, men and women who already hold leadership
positions do not difer in their reported preferences for leading a team. These results mirror the
fnding that gender gaps in promotions and applications are absent for employees who already hold
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leadership positions.
To formally test the hypothesis that responsibility for a team is a key determinant of the gender
gap in applications, I estimate employees’ revealed preferences for leading a team. I leverage a
unique feature of my data, which is that I observe all vacancies to which employees could potentially apply. I construct a dataset at the employee-by-vacancy level that allows me to control for
detailed job features of both employees’ current position as well as those of every job opening in
employees’ application choice set. Since not all frst-level leadership positions involve responsibility
for a team, I am able to estimate the extent to which gender diferences in revealed preferences for
team responsibility explain the gender gap in applications.
The requirement to assume responsibility for a team can explain the entire gap in applications
for promotions to frst-level leadership positions. Controlling for a broad range of job and employee
characteristics, men are 88.9% more likely to apply for frst-level leadership positions if they require
leading a team; however, leading a team does not make women more likely to apply. The efect of
team leadership is not explained by alternative channels, such as stated job fexibility, how selective
the job opening appears, or the female composition of coworkers. Moreover, male and female survey
respondents are equally informed about job postings. Together, these fndings imply the existence
of a gender gap in employees’ revealed preferences for leading a team.
How can female representation in leadership positions be increased? Responses from the employee survey suggest that women and men difer substantially in their preferences for job characteristics that are typically associated with leading a team, such as the size of the team, the likelihood of
negative interactions that lead to resistance by the team, and the likelihood of unpredictable events
that cause overtime. Using the responses of current team leaders as factual benchmark, I also fnd
that women at lower-level positions have more negative perceptions of team leadership. In contrast,
perceptions of diferential treatment with respect to getting hired into a leadership position and
treatment as a leader do not seem to play an important role for the gender gap in preferences for
leadership.
The results in this chapter highlight that frms’ job architecture plays a key role for women’s
underrepresentation in leadership positions. Policies that increase the share of frst-level leadership
positions that require only limited responsibility for a team can likely help to reduce the bottleneck
in women’s career progression. Similarly, policies that provide early exposure to leadership and
encourage women to try out frst-level leadership, such as job rotations or mentoring programs, may
be efective tools to bridge the leadership gap by providing more accurate information about team
leadership.
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